




Coming to Grips with Realism 
 
TRACY LLANERA 
Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia 
tracy.llanera@mq.edu.au; tracy.llanera@gmail.com 
 
ACCEPTED Nov 2015 - Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and 
Social Theory  
 
Retrieving Realism renders the joint philosophical goals of 
Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor into what is probably 
their final and most concise form. It has two main 
objectives: first, it aims to deconstruct the mediationalism 
that undergirds Western philosophy, and second, it 
endorses contact theory, or embodied/embedded coping, 
as an alternative. In this essay, I present the book’s most 
salient themes and reveal areas that are ripe for further 
philosophical consideration. I also direct the reader to the 
work’s genuine ontological challenge: how to come to 
grips with contact theory beyond the borders of 
epistemology. 
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The book Retrieving Realism has been in the works for more than a 
decade. In 2004, Dreyfus signaled Taylor’s intention to publish a monograph 
bearing the name in the article “Taylor's (Anti-) Epistemology.” The book was 
supposed to outline “a detailed phenomenological alternative to current 
epistemology.”1 Three years later, Taylor footnoted the same title in A Secular 
Age, pegging it this time as a co-written project with Dreyfus. Their work 
promised to offer “a fuller description of modern epistemology and its 
deconstruction.”2 In 2013, Taylor published a preview of the work as his 
contribution to Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World, a volume dedicated to 																																																								
1 Hubert Dreyfus, “Taylor's (Anti-) Epistemology” in Charles Taylor, ed. Ruth Abbey 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 79.  
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 834. 
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the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell.3 The essay was also given 
the same name. 
The long-awaited fruit of the Dreyfus-Taylor alliance has finally come 
to print in June 2015. Retrieving Realism stands as an account that précises the 
agenda of two of the most prominent philosophers of our time. It renders 
their joint philosophical goals into what is probably their final and most 
concise form. The first objective of the book is to advance a powerful critique 
of the “mediational” picture of knowledge that undergirds the Western 
tradition. Its second objective, contra the inner/outer structure that dominates 
modern epistemology, is to endorse what Dreyfus and Taylor call “contact” 
theory—in more familiar jargon, embodied or embedded coping—as its 
viable philosophical replacement.  The twofold goal of both thinkers is to 
criticize and to revolutionize our understanding of how human beings really 
think and act in the world. Their work, then, is nothing short of ambitious. 
The book is divided into eight parts. The first chapter, which begins 
with Wittgenstein’s famous phrase which goes, “A picture held us captive. 
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably,”4 problematizes the image that today 
holds philosophy in thrall: the Mind-in-World picture of mediational 
epistemology. According to Dreyfus and Taylor, mediationalism runs wide 
and deep, and affects even the philosophical revolutions that claim to have 
escaped its dualist snare. This picture has its roots in Cartesian dualism. 
Descartes argued that external (physical) reality can only be accessible 
through mediational (mental) entities he called “ideas,” which he held 
responsible for averting skepticism and establishing certainty. Knowledge, 
following the Cartesian legacy, is thus framed as the (correct) inner depiction 
of outer reality. Dreyfus and Taylor point out that at present, the inner/outer 
structure functions as a recurring motif in linguistic, materialist, critical, and 
postmodernist traditions. In pegging knowledge, or what we take to be true, 
as obtained from “ideas” (Descartes; Locke), “categories” (Kant), “surface 
irritations” (Quine), or as manifested by “beliefs” or “sentences-held-true” 
(Davidson; Rorty), the general conceptual structure of mediational opposition 
remains intact. We have access to knowledge only through an epistemic 
relation that exists between us and—as distinct and separate from—the 
world.  
																																																								
3 See Charles Taylor, “Retrieving Realism” in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: 
The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, ed. Joseph K. Schear (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 61-
90. In relation to this work, see also Charles Taylor, “Foundationalism and the Inner-Outer 
Distinction” in Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, ed. Nicholas H. Smith (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), 106-119. 
 4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997), 48. 
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 But how do we escape this overarching picture? In the second chapter, 
Dreyfus and Taylor briefly narrate the progress of the Kantian and Hegelian 
metaphilosophical attempts to overcome this knowledge-game, and argue 
that at present, the phenomenology of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Todes 
have been the most helpful in pointing us in the proper direction. Standing on 
their shoulders, Dreyfus and Taylor make the constructive claim that contact 
theory can function as the better alternative to mediationalism. The technique 
that they employ goes something like this: to go beyond the mediational 
picture, we must attempt to reveal what lies beneath it. That is, there must 
exist a more primordial picture that underlies current epistemology, and that 
disclosing this unarticulated background can change the pre-given rules of 
the game. And what truly lies beneath all our conscious capacities and 
practices, according to Dreyfus and Taylor, is our unmediated access to the 
world—a prereflexive, prelinguistic, and prepropositional kind of bodily-
engaged contact. They assert the argument that “the alternative picture which 
merges once we deconstruct the mediational one, through a consistent 
metacritical turn, is one of an embodied agent, embedded in a society, and at 
grips with the world.”5   
 
Rehearsing Realism 
Six philosophically weighty chapters follow to dismantle the 
mediational picture and justify the alternative contact position. These 
chapters are heavy not in the sense that they are difficult to read (both 
thinkers write lucidly), but in the sense that they serve as a summary and 
defense of their positions in previous philosophical debates. Dreyfus and 
Taylor usually begin each chapter by exposing a salient epistemological issue, 
repudiating claims relating to it, and then offering how the contact theory 
turns things around. In this review, I highlight the most important points and 
arguments of each chapter, and reveal areas that I take as ripe for further 
philosophical consideration. Proceeding from the general critique of 
representationalism in the first two chapters, parts three to five of the book 
are dedicated to refuting, in greater detail, the first big assumption that has 
emerged from mediationalist theory: the primacy of representation. This 
assumption involves the idea that representation is the central and most 
crucial part of experience.  
The third chapter, which deals with issues surrounding 
foundationalism, realism, and anti-realism, spends a lot of time discussing 
Rorty’s antifoundationalist disavowal of the need to engage this dualist 
representational epistemology. To surmount the realist/anti-realist divide, 
Rorty argues that we should forsake this split and be satisfied with pragmatic, 																																																								
5 Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 91. 
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linguistic coping; after all, while things in the universe can be causally 
independent of us, nothing can be representationally independent.6 Dreyfus 
and Taylor claim that in so doing, Rorty finds himself in a bind: he remains a 
representationalist philosopher (in arguing for truth as belief, its 
representational substitute) with an a priori habit (in deciding that what is 
empirically given is philosophically uncontroversial). By simply jettisoning 
the question, they conclude that Rorty’s tactic fails to dispel the temptations 
toward foundationalism—an accusation that is, of course,  open to dispute. 
Contra Rorty, Dreyfus and Taylor defend the importance of coming to terms 
with our epistemological problems, which the two of them do in their attempt 
to overturn mediationalism phenomenologically. To go beneath the 
inner/outer epistemological structure, they argue that we have (1) to allow for 
the possibility of preconceptual understanding; (2) to see that this 
understanding arises from an embodied agent, determining the significances 
of things that are impressed upon it by its environment; (3) to realize that this 
preconceptual locus of sense-making originates from our bodily interaction 
with the world; and (4) to recognize that we can disengage ourselves from 
this prior, pervasive mode of engagement. This is the point when we switch 
to conceptual thinking, which involves the process of forming beliefs that are 
propositionally renderable. 
The fourth chapter, which rehearses the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, 
provides the opportunity for clarifying what embodied, embedded 
preconceptual coping is like. McDowell, Dreyfus, and Taylor commonly 
recognize the futility of what Sellars coined the Myth of the Given, or the idea 
that knowledge is grounded in our reception of simple, brute data: “givens” 
that exist independently of us. They also share the belief that our engaged 
embodiment is responsible for our spontaneous acquisition of persuasive 
belief and our harmonious attunement with the environment. The difference 
is that in McDowell’s view, this embodied spontaneity is pervaded by 
conceptuality and takes propositional form, while for Dreyfus and Taylor, our 
primordial grasp of the world is thoroughly preconceptual. The latter doubt if 
all human activities can be structured propositionally as McDowell would 
have us to believe.  
I present two of their substantive reasons here. First, Dreyfus and 
Taylor argue for the importance of prereflexive coping skills that are required 
for a meaningful encounter with the world. Take Heidegger’s example of a 
badly-placed chalkboard: the reason we understand that it is incorrectly 
placed is because we are oriented to the manifestness of the lecture room. This 
manifestness, which functions as a prereflexive understanding of what a 
lecture room is supposed to be, is the condition of possibility for making 																																																								
6 Richard Rorty, “Charles Taylor on Truth” in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers 
III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 86.  
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judgments about the things in that particular space: “On one level, my action 
in moving the board is done for a conceptualized reason (it’s badly placed); 
on another I am responding preconceptually to this meaningful miniworld.”7 
Second, following Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus and Taylor contend that human 
beings are able to cope prelinguistically, e.g., in the case of a child jumping on 
rocks, without knowing how to articulate what rocks are, and 
prepropositionally, e.g., in the case of a man skillfully driving to his 
destination without accounting for his every move. Given skill-intensive 
examples like these, Dreyfus and Taylor regret McDowell’s resistance to the 
preconceptual, and allege that their phenomenological contact theory better 
accounts for the way human beings skillfully function in the world. 
The fifth chapter begins with a reiteration of how contact theory helps 
us realize that everything is a “co-production” between us and the world. But 
there is still a popular objection—one made salient by neuroscientific 
developments and experimental films like The Matrix—against 
embodied/embedded understanding that needs to be met: Searle’s brain-in-
the-vat challenge. Searle’s Cartesian hypothesis purports that the interactions 
in the brain are sufficient to produce conscious experiences, casting doubt 
upon the indispensability of the world in our experiential process. Dreyfus 
and Taylor engage this problem thoroughly, but I will only mention two of 
their strongest replies here. First, following Merleau-Ponty, they think that 
Searle’s and The Matrix’s attempt to question the reality of world already 
manifests a kind of fundamental misunderstanding: to propose the possibility 
that we can wake up from a fake world to a real world already necessitates 
our engaged participation within a world. In short, for Dreyfus and Taylor, 
the fake/real world question is not a meaningful one at all, and is an extreme 
application of mediationalism. Second, assuming that this framework were 
possible, the most that they can agree with is that brain states can serve the 
purpose of providing necessary causal conditions for experience. Dreyfus and 
Taylor insist, however, that sufficient conditions for meaningful experiences 
require the agent’s skillful, embodied coping.  
After going through an extensive rebuttal of the primacy of 
representation in the first half of the book, the sixth chapter of Retrieving 
Realism refutes mediational theory’s second assumption: the primacy of the 
monological. This bias, which grounds our philosophical tradition’s 
preference for an explicit, decentered, and disengaged way of thinking, is 
founded on the notion that knowledge is based on individual representation. 
Against this stance, Dreyfus and Taylor argue for a shift away from the 
monological by comparing Gadamer’s philosophy with the work of 
Davidson. The issue at hand here is whether or not it is at all possible to reach 
universal understanding, given that mediationalism leads us to believe that 																																																								
7 Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, 84. 
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each individual, as well as each culture, would have their own monological 
scheme of defining human meanings. Both Davidson and Gadamer challenge 
the problem of unintelligibility and deep incommensurability between 
persons and cultures, but operate very differently. Davidson’s position is 
epistemologically-based, i.e., I construe you, most of the time, in my terms to 
understand how you think and act in your terms. This is how the process of 
understanding always begins. Dreyfus and Taylor find this position too 
imposing and vulnerable to ethnocentrism. Gadamer’s position, meanwhile, 
is ontologically-based, i.e., we are all equally in contact with the real, and 
what is needed for genuine understanding is for the interweaving, and 
eventually the fusion, of our many different ways of seeing things. Dreyfus 
and Taylor favor Gadamer’s work, and argue that it is a good way of 
displacing the primacy of the monological with the significance of 
conversation through contact theory. 
 
Questioning the Grip 
The realism that Dreyfus and Taylor defend appears unproblematic at 
this stage, but they suddenly raise the stakes of their proposal in the seventh 
chapter. They are not satisfied with the position that everything is a co-
production with the world; they also want to uphold the existence of, and our 
possible access to, the universe-in-itself. In short, they argue for the realist 
claim that the universe exists independently of us. This may seem like a 
surprising, even paradoxical turn of events, given their commitment to the 
anti-metaphysical stance of phenomenology and hermeneutics that we have 
explored in the previous section. But this realism, in fact, is a familiar theme 
in the works of Dreyfus and Taylor, who have both been in conversation with 
Rorty about the importance of keeping the for-us/in-itself distinction when we 
talk about objective truth and natural science.8 Dreyfus and Taylor defend a 
robust realist position: they think that independent reality must exist to 
ground natural science. They call Rorty a deflationary realist, or someone 
who thinks that everything, including natural science, can only be understood 
according to the background of embedded coping. The reason why Dreyfus 
and Taylor think that their position is superior is because they see evidence 
that the universe itself supports our ability to optimally cope, or come to 																																																								
8 In the sixties and seventies, Rorty, Dreyfus, and Taylor were involved in much 
philosophical discussion on the role of interpretation in the natural and the social sciences, as 
well as human existence more generally. These decades displayed a strong resurgence of 
interest in hermeneutics, largely precipitated by the publication of Hans Georg-Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method [Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen, 1960)]. A good illustration of these 
debates is a themed issue of The Review of Metaphysics in 1980. See The Review of Metaphysics 
34.1 (1980): Hubert Dreyfus, “Holism and Hermeneutics,” 3-23; Charles Taylor, 
“Understanding in Human Science,” 25-38; Richard Rorty, “A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor,” 
39-46; and “Rorty, Taylor and Dreyfus: A Discussion,” 47-55. 
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grips, with its nature. Here they rely on Todes, whose phenomenological 
work shows that human beings are wired to be in sync with the structures of 
the universe. For Todes, we function effectively because we are oriented to 
the influence of the earth’s vertical field; Dreyfus and Taylor take this to be 
“the most illuminating instance of the special combination of spontaneity and 
receptivity required in our stance to the universe in order for us to act 
effectively in the world.” 9  This is an example of how the “Real” itself 
facilitates, supports, and limits human experience. Dismissing this, as Rorty 
does, closes the possibility of realizing that progress in natural science not 
only elucidates but also improves our contact with an independent universe.  
What understanding can we derive from all of this? On the one hand, 
we can raise the criticism that Dreyfus and Taylor have inevitably fallen back 
to mediationalism. The inner/outer structure is evident in their division 
between the realism of our embodied experience and the independent reality 
of the universe. It is strange that they even seem to be unaware of the self-
undermining implications of their claim. On the other, this carefully argued 
strategy of re-positioning the in-itself in their version of contact theory could 
also be interpreted as integral to the consolidation of their realist stance. 
Science, after all, is how they fully retrieve realism and crush the vestiges of 
anti-realism. Furthermore, we must not forget that they are clear in saying 
that this hypothesis is true only when we talk about natural science, but not 
when we talk about other things. This multifaceted dilemma is the crux of the 
book, and is evidently a rich site for debate. We see this potential at play in 
the last chapter, where Dreyfus and Taylor officially go beyond the margins 
of epistemology and cross over to history, religion, politics, culture, and even 
literature to conclude their work.  
What is at stake in the eighth chapter is the hope of transcending the 
conflicting frameworks that dominate the atmosphere of the contemporary 
period: scientism (universalism) and subjectivism (relativism). Dreyfus and 
Taylor propose an ontology of pluralistic robust realism, which they recognize 
is a position that will vex both camps mentioned above. This view is 
pluralistic since it defends the possibility of “multiple ways of interrogating 
reality,” robustly realist in the sense that these ways reveal independent 
truths that “require us to revise and adjust our thinking to grasp them,” and 
plural in the belief that unifying these different ways of truth-interrogation 
“into a single mode of questioning” is bound to fail.10 In the case of gold, for 
instance, modern science reveals that it has the atomic number 79, while the 
religion of Ancient Egypt discloses that this element has a sacred, divine 
nature. These definitions of gold are incommensurable, yet are both robustly 
real for Dreyfus and Taylor.  The point here is that these kinds of truths are 																																																								
9 Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, 136. 
 10 Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, 154. 
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accessible only through specific and genuine ways of dealing with the same 
reality.  
At this stage, the realism of Dreyfus and Taylor seems to be swaying 
toward the mild side of relativism. However, they are quick to re-qualify this 
in the last section of the book. They offer an example-driven defense of the 
possibility of scientific, religious, and even moral unification. Compelling 
arguments in favor of supersession (the gradual correction of previously-held 
beliefs) and convergence (the gradual reconciliation of plural perspectives) 
exist, which, according to them, support the idea that unification may come to 
pass in the future. History is brimming with significant examples—Axial 
revolutions, scientific progress, universal human rights—that heighten the 
chance of arriving at some general consensus surrounding important areas of 
human life. With this in mind, Dreyfus and Taylor end their book rather 
ambivalently: as regards unification, they endorse “just a healthy suspension 
of judgment about its possibility, along with the recognition that further 
unification is well worth trying—and even, for some of us, a faith that pushes 
us to go on trying.” 11  But one is left questioning: does this ambivalence 
destabilize or weaken their joint contact-epistemology in the end? Or does 
this less dogmatic, even hopeful way of treating the problem help reorient the 
way we can do philosophy?  
Overall, we can clearly see that the level of theoretical and practical 
ambition of Retrieving Realism is very high. It is the kind that only 
philosophers of the caliber of Dreyfus and Taylor can convincingly tackle. At 
the same time, this ambition is already present in much of their previously 
and separately published work, where their dissatisfaction with epistemology, 
and modern philosophical game-changers like Rorty, Davidson, and 
McDowell, is evident. We know from their earlier works that Dreyfus and 
Taylor champion a realist stance and share the belief in the fundamentality of 
embodied existence and experience. We are also conscious of their praise for 
the phenomenology of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Todes, as well as their 
appropriation of the hermeneutics of Gadamer. We are, in short, able to 
recognize and weigh all of these features without needing to read their new, 
co-authored book. But I think that there is something indispensable in the 
experience of being prompted anew about what great philosophical ideas, 
and great philosophers, can really do to change the way things are. This book 
is illuminating in this regard.  
Dreyfus and Taylor are mindful of the practical impact of 
philosophical thought, and they raise this as a gentle reminder in the last 
section of the first chapter. They point out that the mediationalism they are 
combating is “not only an epistemic stance; it is part of a broader ideal, that of 
freedom and responsibility, which determines a way of being in the world in 																																																								
11 Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, 168. 
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general, and not just a way of practicing science.”12 The mediational stance of 
critical disengagement has deep and inextricable links to many areas of life, 
ranging from the way we understand human autonomy, the nature of the 
moral and social ideals we hold dear, and even the phenomenon of 
secularism in the West. While these elements can be regarded as modern 
achievements, we cannot deny that they carry their set of dissatisfactions as 
well—dissatisfactions that may seem insurmountable and without alternative 
if we remain trapped within the mediationalist Bild that keeps us captive. If 
we find the things that Dreyfus and Taylor say convincing, then we have yet 
to constructively reflect on how their version of a contact picture can deeply 
change our ways. This, in my view, is the real challenge of their ontology that 
we need to respond to. At least in the area of epistemology, Retrieving Realism 
shows us succinctly where and how to start coming to grips with this task. 
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